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I.

INTRODUCTION

A discussion of terrorism should begin by settling on some at least
working definition of what constitutes terrorism. At the outset, it is also
helpful to characterize some of its species: state terrorism, sub-state
terrorism (carried out under the aegis of an organized group with
determinate, usually political, goals), and individual terrorism. My interest
is principally in state terrorism. State terrorism-or so I shall argue-is the
main engine for creating and sustaining the other forms of terrorism. Take
away the brutal repressiveness, the grave injustice, and the exploitation and
crushing of people's lives that is endemic to a state that practices state
terrorism and, in time, other forms of terrorism will eventually wither away.
Where some instances of sub-state terrorism remain, they will be much
diminished in force, for the simple reason that they will no longer have the
tacit support of vast numbers of brutalized and savagely exploited victims
of state terrorism. Some acts of individual terror and individual terrorism
will probably always be with us, but these will also become more infrequent
in the absence of state terrorism. Stated otherwise, in order to achieve
©2003, K. Nielsen.
Professor Emeritus, Department of Philosophy, University of Calgary and Adjunct Professor,
Concordia University.
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something approximating a terror-free world, state terrorism must be
confronted and eliminated.'
I should make one further preliminary set of remarks. We should
distinguish war from terrorism. We could have war without terrorism, even
state terrorism. War, particularly modern war, usually brings along with it
terrorism, but, at least conceptually speaking, it need not. War, even a very
dirty war, may involve no terrorism. Combatants may be killed in all sorts
of devious ways, but still we might not have terrorism. But where we have
violence employed against non-combatants or civilians to further political,
religious, or ideological ends or to undermine the political, religious, or
ideological positions of others, then we have terrorism. But we need not
have war when we have terrorism. However, such terror is sometimes used
as a device to trigger a war or as a tactical device in fighting a war.
Sometimes very weak nations use terrorism as a tactic in fighting a stronger
nation. But terrorism can be used in a war by a strong nation in an attempt
to push into surrender a weaker nation. While war is one thing and
terrorism is another, it is often the case that terrorism is a tactic of war and
with the ubiquity of undeclared wars there is no sharp or clear dividing line
between terrorism as a tactic to start a war and terrorism that is part of the
tactics of war. There are, however, clear paradigms of each type; the
bombing of a purely military airport is not terrorism though it may provoke
a terrorist response, and the killing of the young children of a
diplomat-clearly, a terrorist act-may lead to war although it is not an act
of war.
In this commentary, I shall do two things. First, I shall characterize
and discuss terrorism in general, in order to clarify this otherwise ill-defined
concept. Second, I shall discuss when, if ever, terrorism might be morally
justified.
II.

WHAT IS TERRORISM?

At the outset, it is necessary to settle on an acceptable definition of
terrorism, whether state or otherwise. Of course, we are likely not going to
be able to give a definition or characterization that tracks completely and
exclusively all and only those actions that are reasonably called acts of
terrorism. We are not going to get what philosophers call necessary and
sufficient conditions for the concept of terrorism. However, this does not
IIdo not wish for a moment to deny that states need to find ways to protect people living in their
territories from terrorist attacks. This need will be particularly acute in the dangerous time before the
good effects of the ending of state terrorism will ,take effect. But both out of prudence and decency it
must do so in ways that do not revert to state terrorism.
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reveal anything particularly unusual or troublesome about terrorism, for it
is true of all concepts with any content. There is no essence of terrorism or
anything else. However, there are a number of definitions that, while
sufficiently different and indeterminate so as not to yield a single definition
free of all ambiguity, are sufficiently determinate, particularly when taken
together, to deliver us from the fog of Bushian blabber about "the War on
Terrorism."2 For my purposes, it is sufficient to cite six particularly
illustrative definitions of terrorism:
1.

"Terrorism is the use of coercive means aimed at civilian
populations in an effort to achieve political, religious or
other aims."3

2.

Terrorism is the tactic of intentionally targeting noncombatants with lethal or severe violence for political
purposes.

3.

"[Terrorism is] the use of more or less random violence
against whole populations."4

4.

"Terrorism is the deliberate killing of innocent people, at
random, in order to spread fear through a whole
population and force the hand of its political leaders."5

5.

"Terrorism is the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its
use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating
them, or other people, into a course of action they would
otherwise not take."6

6.

"Terrorism consists in aiming specifically at civilian targets

2 Alex P. Schmid, PoliticalTerrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and
Literature (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1983). Appendix I at 119-58 provides 109 different

definitions of terrorism given between the years 1936-1981.
Noam Chomsky, "U.S.-A Leading Terrorist State" (2001) 53(6) Monthly Rev.
10 at 19
[Chomsky, "Leading Terrorist State"]. Chomsky's definition was taken from a U.S. Army manual. He
points out that this definition is "almost the same" as the United States' characterization of lowintensity warfare.
4 Norman

Geras, "Our Morals: The Ethics of Revolution" (1989) Socialist Reg.
185 at 199.
Michael Walzer, "Five Questions about Terrorism" (Winter 2002) Dissent
5 at 5.

6 Igor Primoratz, "What is Terrorism?" (1990) 7(2) J. Applied Phil. 129 at 135.
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not directly involved in the opposing side's war effort in
order to spread massive terror among the general
population in furtherance of whatever political result is
being pursued." 7
These definitions, with their differing though overlapping
emphases, provide a reasonable initial understanding for our purposes of
what we are talking about in speaking of terrorism.
Terrorism, as both Chomsky's and Primoratz's definitions make
clear, is not limited to political terrorism, although in this commentary I
shall consider only political terrorism. For the arguments I shall make, any
of the above six definitions will suffice. However, in order to simplify
matters I shall have in mind principally Geras' rather simple definition,
namely that terrorism is "the use of more or less random violence against
whole populations," as well as Chomsky's.8 When the popular media has
anything even somewhat clear in mind, when they discuss terrorism, they
usually have in mind sub-state terrorism carried out by an organized group
for certain determinate political or religious ends. However, it is state
terrorism that is actually the more important phenomenon. As I remarked
initially, there probably would be very little sub-state terrorism if it were not
for the pervasiveness and intensity of state terrorism, and therefore I shall
focus on state terrorism. In speaking of state terrorism, I shall be speaking
of the use by a state of strongly oppressive and typically violent means or
the threat of violent means against civilian populations (either their own or
others) in an effort to achieve political aims.
III.

CAN TERRORISM EVER BE MORALLY JUSTIFIED?

I now turn to the tangled question of whether terrorism can ever be
justified. Conventional wisdom and much of Marxist doctrine holds that it
can never be. 9 Of course, the killing of innocent individuals is always wrong,
but the serious question remains-while killing innocent individuals is
wrong, a horrible almost unmentionable wrong, is it always wrong, all
things considered, where the occurrence of something evil is inescapable
and we are caught in trying to decide between relative evils? When we are
in a situation where we cannot avoid setting evil against evil, is terrorism
Danny Goldstick, "Defining 'Terrorism' (1991) 4(3) Nature, Soc'y, & Thought 261
at 265.
8 1 also use Chomsky's definition precisely because it is a definition used in U.S. Army manuals,
supra note 3. In this way, there can be no accusations that I am not talking about the same thing as the
American officials are talking about in speaking of terrorism.
9 Supra note
7.
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always wrong? To use philosophers' jargon, terrorism is alwaysprimafacie
wrong, but is it, all things considered, always something that must not be
done? Is it always categorically forbidden no matter the consequences of
engaging in or letting (where we can stop it) a terrorist act happen?
Conventional wisdom, I repeat, has it that terrorism is never justified or
even excusable. Should we, with conventional wisdom, be so categorical?
Or should we, as in most moral matters, examine the question on a case by
case basis, avoiding claims of absolute unconditionality? It may well be,
notwithstanding Kant, that there are no sound categorical imperatives.
It would seem at least that the government of the United States, its
explicit condemnation of terrorism notwithstanding, actually thinks that
terrorism is sometimes justified for it believes that the bombing of Dresden
and the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan were justified. U.S.
government officials think that these acts were justified, in spite of being
clearly aimed at civilian populations, in order to induce, or to contribute
toward inducing, their enemy to surrender. But, given our common
understanding of terrorism, these events, whether justified or not, whether
carried out as an act of war or not, clearly constitute terrorist acts.
Therefore, the United States clearly must believe, if its officials have any
clear awareness at all of what they are doing and saying, its public
condemnations of terrorism notwithstanding, that sometimes terrorist acts
are justified.
In order to defend the United States from these allegations of
terrorism, various arguments are deployed. All of these arguments seem to
me to be-though some more obviously so than others-transparently
mistaken. Sometimes it is said that there is no such thing as state terrorism,
for genuine terrorism is only undertaken by sub-state movements bent on
the intimidation of people, and most importantly of governments.,o But this
"defence" of U.S. actions is only a stipulative re-definition. None of the
standard definitions of "terrorism" given above-one of which was
formulated by the U.S. Army-admit of such restrictions. Then there is the
claim that the civilians among the Germans and Japanese were all in one
way or another complicit in the war effort and thus were not, after all,
innocent. While some individuals, of course, were complicit, to hold that
everyone, including children and even babies, were not innocent has no
credibility at all. Even to hold that all adults were complicit is absurd. It is
10 Walter Laqueur, Terrorism (New York: Little Brown, 1977). Edward Herman claims that
Laqueur's definition of terrorism means that there is no such thing as state terrorism. Herman
indicates that Laqueur does not cover the whole spectrum of terror, and characterizes Laqueur's ideas
as "absurd" and illogical. See Edward Herman, The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and
Propaganda(Boston: South End Press, 1982) at 22 [Herman].
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to, in effect, invoke something absurd, and indeed morally offensive, like
the inheritance of the original sin of vicious German-ness or vicious
Japanese-ness for these national populations.
The most plausible defence of acts such as the bombing of Dresden
or the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan, combined with a denial that
these were terrorist acts, is accomplished by invoking the venerable
scholastic principle of double effect. It is a principle that seeks to provide
criteria for determining when it is morally permissible to perform an action
in the pursuit of a good end with the full knowledge that the action in
question will also bring about bad results."1 Put otherwise, it is a principle
attempting to articulate when an action that has both good and bad results
is morally permissible. Can this doctrine be legitimately used to provide a
justification or at least an excuse for some forms of the killing of the
innocent in some circumstances? In order to see whether the principle of
double effect can in some contexts legitimize such actions, it is first
necessary to state the principle. In its standard form, the principle can be
stated as follows: when an action thatis not wrong in itselfhas both good and
badresults,results thatare commensurate(the good resultbeingproportionate
to the bad result), when the good itself is not the result of bad consequences,
when the personso actingdoes not intend the bad result but, while foreseeing
it, lets it happen, even when he or she couldprevent it, his or her action still
can be morally permissible.
In order to apply the principle to terrorism, we must make one
modification, thereby weakening the standard formulation, namely, we
must broaden the definition to include not only actions that are "not wrong
in themselves" but also those that may indeed be wrong in themselves. The
non-standard, weakened version can be stated as follows: when an action
has both good and bad results,results thatare commensurate (the good result
beingproportionateto the bad result), when the good itselfis not the result of
bad consequences, when the person so acting does not intend the bad result,
but, while foreseeingit, lets it happen, even when he orshe couldprevent it, his
or her action still can be morally permissible.
12
The principle in either form can be and has been challenged.
However, for my particular purposes here, I shall set those challenges aside
and assume for the sake of argumentation that the principle is sound, even
in its weakened form. On this assumption, I would then like to consider
Supra note 7.

12 See H.L.A. Hart, "Intention and Punishment" (1967) 4 Oxford Rev. 5,reprinted in Punishment
and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968) at 113. See also Philippa Foot, "The Problem of
Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect" (1967) 5 Oxford Rev. 5, reprinted in Virtues and
Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978) at 19.
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whether the principle can ever be used to justify (a) the killing of the
innocent while (b) denying this killing of the innocent is an act of terrorism.
Certainly, the principle of double effect does indeed have some
problematic conceptions such as "wrong in itself," "commensurate results,"
"proportionate results," and the appeal to intentions. The problematicity
of this appeal to the latter conception is sometimes exacerbated by
appealing to the putatively apparent distinction between what is directly
intended and what is indirectly intended. But again I shall put aside these
considerations for the moment and, assuming that a reasonably clear and
charitable reading can be given to both the standard and non-standard
formulations of the principle of double effect, consider whether either
formulation can be legitimately used to justify the killing of the innocent.
Remember the principle of double effect seeks to give us criteria, or at least
a rationale, for when an action that has both good and bad results is
morally permissible. Killing of the innocent, sometimes, has both good and
bad results. So it looks, at least, as if killing of the innocent could be a
legitimate candidate, on the non-standard form of the principle of double
effect, for being something that is sometimes morally permissible.
However, there can be no justification of, or excuse for, such killing on the
standard form of the principle of double effect, for it proscribes from
justification or excuse any action that is wrong in itself; on any reasonable
understanding, the killing of the innocent is wrong in itself. The principle
of double effect in its non-standardform does not have this restriction. Can
we, if we accept the non-standard formulation of the principle, make the
case that there are some acts of terrorism that are justifiable? Someone
using the non-standard formulation is very likely to think that something
"being wrong in itself' sans context has little sense. Or, one may even think
that nothing can be wrong in itself. Could, given such a way of looking at
things, the killing of the innocent be justified? Could such acts perhaps
even be justified on a weakened understanding of the principle of double
effect?
Let us first note some important places where the principle will not
yield anything that is even remotely permissible, though taken to be
justified by U.S. policy. The bombing of Dresden, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki
fail to meet the conditions specified in even the weakened version of the
principle. It is highly implausible to say the bad effect was not intended.
Military targets were incidental in these places for there were very few of
them. It was the civilian population that was the main target of the
bombing. The massive and terrible killing of innocent people terrorized the
populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and beyond. The central aim was
to force the government of Japan to surrender. This could hardly be
credibly classified as an unintended effect-as just massive collateral
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damage-for the aim was to cause the surrender of the government by
killing masses of innocent people. But, even if that is not accepted, the act
was avoidable for the good effect could have been achieved without such
an act of carnage, an act that I am claiming was state terrorism. At that
stage of the war Japan was on its knees, incapable of inflicting any serious
damage on the Allies. A demonstration of the bomb's power could have
been arranged at sea to convince the Japanese government of the reality
and awesome power of atomic bombs. If still the Japanese did not
surrender, conventional bombing could have continued, aimed only at
military targets, government buildings, and the emperor's residences while
Allied naval forces continued to surround and blockade Japan. Even with
the prolongation of the war, it is plausible to believe that it would have
resulted in few Allied casualties. It would, of course, have been more
expensive for the Allies but that expense surely could neither justify nor
excuse the infliction of such an unprecedented horror. Finally, to take the
worst case scenario, short of deciding to drop the bomb, even if Japan did
not surrender (something very improbable), then an invasion of a crippled
enemy, though it would have cost U.S. lives, would surely not have been as
devastating-have killed so many people in total-as the dropping of those
atomic bombs. Furthermore, such an invasion would not have involved the
deliberate killing of innocent civilians and would not have established such
a horrible precedent.
Thus, even if we accept the principle of double effect, such
bombings-whether called terrorist or not-are not justifiable. Similar
observations can be made for the bombing of Dresden. The grounds for
justifying the use of what I have called state terrorism therefore do not
stand up to scrutiny. They are rather flimsy rationalizations for extremely
brutal acts carried out on civilian populations. Similar things should be said
for the other state terrorist activities carried out by the United States or its
clients and proxies. Of course, it should be noted that there is seldom an
attempt to defend them. They are usually denied, covered up or
re-described so as to look good, for example terrorists re-described as
freedom fighters. 3 Remember Osama bin Laden was a freedom fighter for
Reagan and a terrorist for Bush. One can change sides without changing
tactics-tactics Osama bin Laden learned from the Central Intelligence
Agency-it is just a simple matter of reclassification.
This setting aside of the principle of double effect with respect to
U.S. state terrorism does not, however, answer the question of whether
terrorism and the killing of the innocent can ever be justified. The above
See Herman, supra note 10
at 21.
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discussion simply shows that what the U.S. has done cannot be justified,
with or without double effect arguments. Moreover, there is an ambiguity
that should be noted when we speak of justification here. On the one hand,
something may be tacticallyjustified or, on the other, morallyjustified and,
of course, justified in either or both or neither of these ways. I am
principally interested in whether terrorism in any form, as characterized by
the non-eccentric definitions I have given above, can ever be morally
justified. I think that any terrorismthat can be morallyjustified (ifany can)
must also be tactically justified, but I do not wish the two forms of
justification to be run together. Most importantly, I would argue that
terrorism-more accurately some instances of it-might be tactically
justified without being morally justified; when that is the case, such acts of
terrorism are not justified in the broadsense, since moraljustification is the
criticalissue here.
Marxists-most prominently Vladimir Lenin, Leon Trostky, and
Rosa Luxemburg-were opposed to terrorism, because they thought that
it would not work. They thought terrorism was a bad (counterproductive)
tactic for either making or sustaining a socialist revolution. What it lacked
was a tactical justification. Michael Walzer scorns this purely tactical
analysis, for it suggests that if a terrorist act would work, i.e. be an effective
tactic, it would, moral considerations notwithstanding, be justified full
stop.14 Despite being a Marxist, I contend that for terrorism to be justified,
it must be both tactically and morally justified. Like G.A. Cohen and Geras,
I think and argue that Marxists or Marxians should not be what has been
called Marxist amoralists." Morality is not always mere ideological twaddle
serving the interests of a determinate class or classes under the guise of
answering to universal human interests. Much of what passes for morality
is indeed ideological twaddle, functioning, typically by mystification, to
keep the subordinate classes in line. But not all morality is such
double-talk; indeed, no genuine morality can be. And there can be and is
genuine Marxist moral commitment. Lenin, Trotsky, and Luxemburg were
Marxist amoralists in their conception of themselves, and in their
conception of what it was to be a Marxist. They would deny there was or
even could be, at least in class societies, such a thing as genuine morality.
For them, it was ideology all the way. But in their lives and in their political
actions they showed themselves to be persons of strong moral convictions,
tempered (I believe rightly) by a steadfast recognition of the need to be

15

Walzer, supra note 5 at 7.
Kai Nielsen, Marxism and the MoralPointof View. Morality,Ideology, and HistoricalMaterialism

(Boulder: Westview, 1989) at 117-35.
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tough-minded. Thereby, their practice was better than their theory about
their practice.
But in a Marxist amoralist mindframe, where morality is nothingbut
ideology, one can understand that the only coherent talk of the justification
of terrorism will focus on the tactical. If some violent action works-if it
serves the revolution-it is good and if not, it is bad. Other talk of moral,
non-tactical justification for a consistent Marxist amoralist would be just
spitting into the wind.
In line with what I have said above and what I have argued
elsewhere, I will assume that there can be genuine moral claims-some
claims about justice for example-that can be justified or unjustified in an
objective fashion. I will also assume that Marxists can consistently make
such claims and have such beliefs-the talk of some of them about their
beliefs to the contrary notwithstanding-and indeed that they should have
such beliefs.' 6 Fortified with these moral convictions, Marxists should
investigate whether there are cases where terrorism is not only tactically
justified but where terrorist acts are also morally justified.
That is exactly the possibility that I wish to consider. I think (despite
conventional Marxist wisdom) that there may be some situations where
terrorism may be both tactically and morally justified.1 7 1 could start, as I
have elsewhere, by giving an abstract characterization of a situation in
which it is at least arguable that terrorism would be justified and then go on
to argue that it actually would be justified in such a situation. However,
I shall proceed here by considering a situation currently much under
discussion and contestation and usually said to be the opposite of anything
that could be justified or even excused. I have in mind the terrorist
Palestinian suicide bombers. Indeed, it is usually said that the Palestinian
suicide attacks on Israel, often attacks on innocent civilians, are brutal acts
of insane fanatics. But could they in the present situation, or in any
situation, be justified, both tactically and morally? Most people would say
certainly not. Is it so certain that they would be right?

16

Ibid. The objectivity I have in mind here is the coherentist intersubjectivity
of wide and general
reflective equilibrium. For an explication of this idea see Kai Nielsen, Naturalism without Foundations

(Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1996) at 12-21.
17

Supra note 9 at 264-66.
18 Kai Nielsen, "On the Ethics of Revolution" (1973) 6 Radical Phil. (1973) at 18 [Nielsen,
"Ethics of Revolution"].
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ARE PALESTINIAN SUICIDE ATTACKS IN ISRAEL
MORALLY JUSTIFIABLE?

In examining this question, I shall make certain factual assumptions
that, of course, are challengeable, but assumptions that I think are born
out-or largely born out-by the facts.19 However, if these assumptions
prove to be incorrect, my argument here that terrorism may sometimes be
both morally and tactically justified would collapse. It may collapse anyway,
but it would certainly collapse if my assumptions about the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict are not largely right.
In World War II, with an unprecedented cruelty exceptional for
even the pervasive anti-Semitism of many Christians, some six million Jews
were methodically and coldly murdered in an effort by the Nazis to gain a
Juden-frei world. After the liberation of the concentration camps, many
Jews, utterly understandably, sought to gain a homeland for themselves
where they could finally be safe and live in community with each other
determining their own affairs. That would be as legitimate as any claim
could be, if they had not come to a land settled by others, or if they had
been invited there by the people living there, or if they had purchased the
land from those living there not in a piecemeal fashion but by Jews as a
people from Palestinians as a people. But nothing like any of these things
was possible. The Palestinians were under the control of the British at that
time. What actually happened is that the Palestinians were conquered by
the Jews, driven from their homes or killed in what was in effect an invasion
followed by a dispersion, or made to live in Palestine as a subdued people.
Israel is a settler country that gained its land in the usual way settler
countries gain their land, namely by the brutal dispossession of Palestinians
who had lived on that land for centuries. It is perfectly understandable that
Jews did not want to come to Palestine simply as immigrants to live in what
many of them regarded as their own homeland-a land that nevertheless
was the centuries old homeland of the Palestinians. Still it is the case that
Jewish people had been brutalized for centuries, sometimes with more
intensity than others. They wanted to be free at long last of that
brutalization. They wanted rightly to be able to live free of fear and to live
together as a people where they were acknowledged as such and respected.
But it was the Palestinians' land and, moreover, why should the
Palestinians, most of whom were Muslim, be made to pay for Christian
19 See Edward W. Said, The Politics of Dispossession: The Palestinian Struggle
for SelfDetermination, 1969-1994 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1995); Moustafa Bayoumi & Andrew Rubin,
eds., The Edward Said Reader (New York: Vintage Books, 2000) [Edward Said Reader]; and Edward
W. Said, Power, Politics and Culture (New York: Pantheon Books, 2001).
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crimes?
The Palestinians, with the help of other Arab nations, fought
several wars attempting to regain their land. They were repeatedly defeated
and decisively so in the 1967 War where Israel increased its borders and
widened its areas of control. Many Palestinians ended up in wretched
refugee camps deprived of what was legitimately theirs or they were
incorporated into Israel as second-class citizens without the same rights as
other Israelis and discriminated against in various subtle and not so subtle
ways. 20 Palestinians justifiably have tried to fight back in different ways.
This Palestinian resistance has led Israel, for the sake of its own security,
to occupy more Arab territory (for example, the Golan Heights) and to
invade Lebanon; many people who opposed Israel were killed or tortured
and held in prisons where they were sometimes brutalized. Palestinian
refugee camps in Lebanon were raided at the behest of Ariel Sharon and
many of the refugees were killed. 21 And repeatedly, up to this day, Israel
has continued to take Palestinian land, driving the Palestinians from it.
Without a lot of other changes, there would be little progress if the
Palestinian Authority with its present borders became a state. With the
settlements remaining in place and with Israeli controlled access routes to
the settlements criss-crossing Palestine, a Palestinian state would not be a
viable nation-state.
Faced with Israel's continued expansionism, the seizure of more
Palestinian lands, and the exploitation of Palestinians in Israel, the
Palestinians began to fight back with the feeble resources they have. And
in this uneven struggle, where Israel has vastly superior firepower, as well
as support from the United States, Israel has continued to oppress and
humiliate Palestinians and not only those doing the fighting.
Gradually coming to recognize the farce of the Oslo accords,
accords designed for the stronger party that held most of the cards in the
negotiations, and as well facing unremitting ill-treatment on Israel's part,
Palestinians resorted to a grisly sort of response, namely that of Palestinian
militants blowing themselves up in crowded places in Israel and by doing
so, killing innocent men, women, and children.22 These are clearly terrorist
acts by any reasonable definition of terrorism. These acts have been
described in accurate and graphic terms. We are treated to accounts of
body parts being scattered all over the place and of people gravely wounded
in the attacks crying out in intolerable pain. The killing and maiming of
20 Avi Schlaim, "Violent Means, Violent Ends" (2002) 166(17) The Guardian Weekly at 12.
21 Ibid.
22 See Edward Said Reader,supra note 19 at 382-91.
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innocent people to achieve the political ends of the Palestinians are, by any
account, extreme, desperate, terrorist acts. Most of their political ends are
indeed justified, but can such means of fighting for them possibly be
justified?
Unless we adopt something like pure pacifism, and take as
categoricalthat we may never do evil that good may come, we cannot take
an a prioriroad (moral or otherwise) to the rejection of terrorism. But such
a pacifism (religious or secular) is untenable. If it were justified, we would
never be justified in using even the slightest violence. We would not be
justified in using violence against a person in order to stop him from
machine gunning a group of unsuspecting and innocent people, even if that
were the only way to stop him. Similarly, a categorical pacifism would not
allow for the killing of a crazed President of the United States who was
about to release a signal that would set off the delivery of an array of
hydrogen bombs that would very likely destroy most human and animal life
on earth. But to refrain from violence in such situations is an extreme form
of moral irresponsibility-indeed moral insanity-that no reasonable,
morally serious person, clear about the consequences, could even seriously
contemplate. It is a reductio of pacifism.23
To think seriously about the Palestinian suicide terrorists, we need
to fully recognize and take to heart that modem war (perhaps all war) is a
very dirty business indeed, where terrorism, and particularly state terrorism,
is utilized routinely by almost all the combatants. Fascist Spain and Italy
used it, as did Apartheid South Africa, as did Nazi Germany, as did Japan
against China, the Philippines, and Korea. France employed state terrorism
in its war with Algeria. The Soviet Union used it against its own population
as did China. Israel used it against Lebanon and is using it against the
Palestinians. Latin America, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Colombia, and
Guatemala have used state terrorism. Russia has employed it in Chechnya.
And the United States wins the prize for using it.24
Moreover, and crucially for our considerations here, in fighting
state terrorism, counterterrorism is not infrequently deployed, as
exemplified by the Algerians in their fight against French state terrorism.
It seems as if modem war is unavoidably terroristic: in certain situations
23 See Kai Nielsen, "On Terrorism and Political Assassination" in Harold M. Zellner, ed.,
Assassination (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1974) at 107-09 [Nielsen, "Terrorism and Political

Assassination"].
24 See Chomsky, "Leading Terrorist State," supra note 3; Herman, supra note 10. See also
Michael Parenti, The Terrorism Trap: September 11 and Beyond (San Francisco: City Lights Books,
2002); Rahul Mahajan, The New Crusade:America's War on Terrorism (New York: Monthly Review
Press, 2002).
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civilians are deliberately killed for political ends. This fact, horrible as it is,
just goes-or at least seems to go-with modem war. If pure pacifism is
untenable (as it must be), then, given the nature of modem war and the
justifiability of some wars, for example, the war against the Nazis, terrorism
must be justifiable in some situations. We have learned that to will the end
is to will the necessary means to the end. Still there are things that cannot
rightly be done under any war circumstances, even those. Captured enemy
soldiers cannot be shot, nor can wounded enemy soldiers just be left on the
battlefield to die. Yet, sometimes even these things cannot be avoided,
though they are always very wrong.25 It is without the slightest doubt a
terrible thing to kill innocent people. Killing is itself terrible and the killing
of the innocent is much worse. In this context, can Palestinian terrorist
tactics possibly be justified or even excused?
The Palestinians, as everybody knows, are in a military sense, to
understate it, far weaker than the Israelis. In a war where there is the
terrorism of the powerful, there is also the terrorism of the weak. 26 The
world is horribly awash with terrorism. In such a world where people are
terrorized themselves, why are they not justified, where they cannot protect
themselves without resorting to terrorism, in fighting terrorism with
counterterrorism, particularly when it-or so it certainly seems-is the only
weapon they have that will enable them to bring their enemies to accept
their rights and to stop oppressing them? If there is some non-violent or
less violent alternative, of course they should take it. One cannot simply say
they should defend themselves and achieve their aims through peaceful
negotiations; they have been trying that to no avail for years, but the Israeli
occupation of their lands just continues. 27 But if this violent course is the
only way to stop their oppression and to gain what they firmly believe is
their right, why are they not justified in taking it?
If the response is that in so acting they kill innocent people and that
such killing is evil, the proper reply to that response is in turn (1) that by
not so responding, even more harm-more evil-will obtain and (2) that,
whether they kill or not, the lesser evil should be done. If, where there is no
other alternative, ten innocent people survive while one innocent person
dies, that is the lesser evil and it isn't crude utilitarianism or necessarily

25 See Kai Nielsen "There is No Dilemma of Dirty Hands" in Paul Rynard & David Shugman
eds., Cruelty and Deception (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview, 2000) at 139-56.
26 Noam Chomsky, "Terrorism, Weapon of the Powerful" Le Monde Diplomatique [English

Edition] (December 2001) at 2-3 [Chomsky, "Terrorism"].
27 See EdwardSaid Reader,supra note 19.
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utilitarian at all to believe that. 2 Even deontologists and Rawlsian
egalitarians sometimes use consequentialist reasoning. The question is
about the scope of consequentialist reasoning. Any reasonable moral
theory must be consequence-sensitive. The reasoning in this case is that
where, no matter what is done, some evil is unavoidable, it is better that the
lesser evil be done. Everything that can obtain in these unavoidable
circumstances is vile. The reasonable and right thing to do in those
circumstances, where the doing or letting happen of some vile thing is
unavoidable, is to do the least vile thing. To say "Never do vile things no
matter what" is evasive. To do nothing and simply wring one's hands over
the problem of dirty hands is, as understandable as it is, romantic
irresponsibility and a failure to face up to moral realities. Jean-Paul Sartre
and Maurice Merleau-Ponty are better guides here than Walzer and Leszeh
Kolakowski.2 9
There are at least possible circumstances then where a terrorist act
is the less evil alternative. And this lesser evil, in such a circumstance, is the
alternative to be taken. That is where this analysis obtains, where the
terrorist act is the less-evil act, the terrorist act should be done. We must
not be evasive about this. It is, of course, morally wrenching when we have
to make such choices. Not even a halfway decent person can accept with
equanimity the killing or harming of the innocent. But are we going to
accept with equanimity letting an even greater evil transpire where we can
do something about it? That is a horrible choice with which we can in
certain circumstances be faced. Sometimes no matter what we do or let
happen we cannot but act arbitrarily. However, it is not always so. It is more
likely to be the case, where we face an unavoidable choice between grave
evils, where no matter what we do, we do something that is evil, there still
remains a choice between a greater and a lesser evil. And in these situations
we should choose the lesser evil.30 Sometimes faced with two terrible evils,
both of which cannot be avoided, we can ascertain the lesser evil. And
there, where we choose the lesser evil, we in doing so act rightly and we do
not act arbitrarily. To not accept this is to be evasive-indeed morally
evasive.
What actually stands in opposition to terrorist suicide bombers, if
the situation is as I described it, is not morality but tactics. Such terrorism,
to return to our example, may only stiffen Israeli resolve-as seems to be
happening as I write this commentary-and the Israelis by extreme,
28 See Kai Nielsen, Ethics Without God (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1990) at 128-62.
29 See Nielsen, "Ethics of Revolution," supra note 18.
30 See ibid. and Nielsen, "Terrorism and Political Assassination," supra note 23.
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counter-terrorist methods may crush, though probably only for a time, the
Palestinian resistance. In short, there may be good moral grounds for the
Palestinians to so act if doing so will be effective. But if not, since doing so
is a great primafacie wrong, its futility (if futile it is) would make it doubly
wrong, all things considered. But we will not find out whether that tactic is
futile by moral reasoning.That is an empirical matter; sometimes terrorist
resistance works and sometimes it does not. That is another of the terrible
difficulties in such situations. The Algerian resistance, after extreme
provocation by France, resorted to terrorist tactics and was for a time
crushed--effectively eliminated-by French elite troops.31 The anger
among the Algerian population was so great that, after a time, Algerian
resistance rose again and guerrilla warfare replaced terrorism and
eventually the French were defeated. Similar things, though not on such a
scale, seem to have happened in Northern Ireland. But sometimes, as with
the Red Brigades or with the Bader-Meinhof group, they were just crushed.
Whether such terrorism will work is, to repeat, an empirical matter. What
any group contemplating the use of terrorist tactics must clearly consider
is (a) whether doing so, even if it will work, is morally justifiable and (b)
whether it will work, or is tactically justified. The latter requires a clear
understanding of the empirical possibilities, what is more likely to be the
case, the costs of terrorist acts, and the predictable reactions to which
terrorist acts give rise. The former requires a clear understanding of what
morality requires and permits, and a clear grasp of where the greater evil
lies.
If turning to terrorism will not work, if it will not achieve its goal,
it is also clearly morally wrong under those circumstances. But if it will
work, it does not follow that it is morally justified. To know whether it is
justified is to have very strong reasons for believing that among the various
possibly effective tactics, which ones (if any) are morally justified. That is
a hard thing to know and, where there is reasonable doubt, a terrorist tactic
should not be employed.32 But, while it is difficult to determine, sometimes
we can know, or at least have good reason to believe, that the tactic is
morally justified. We can know that a person of sound moral principle will,
if her or his will is strong enough, act in accordance with what she or he
On this topic, see the unforgettable portrayal in the film The Battle ofAlgiers
(Casbah & Igor
Films, 1965).

32 Here I worry if I am implicitly backtracking on what I have argued here-blunting the force
of it. Doing what philosophers are so prone to do, namely first you say it and then you take it back.
This is surely not my intent here. I mean, though not without some ambivalence, to stick to my guns.
Yet the qualification I have just made in my text also seems to me something that we should say and
say with conviction.
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knows she or he ought to do. But when our good reasons to believe do not
add up to what we would take to be a well-grounded belief, we have an
even more horrific situation. What is to be done remains wrenchingly
problematic. Things are so vile that it is difficult to know even how to
articulate them. It is tempting to throw up one's hands in such situations
and say there is no rational or morally acceptable solution. But to acquiesce
in letting, without a struggle, state terrorism continue, is to accept in that
context the most horrible thing among the relevant horrible things. If we
are moral beings, that acquiescence is something we must not fall into.33
One final caution. This discussion does not open up everything here
to a kind of relativism, namely that Israelis might consider their own
country's counterterrorism to be morally justified in countering Palestinian
terrorism and Palestinians at the same time would consider Palestinian
counterterrorism to be justified in countering Israeli terrorism, and that
they are both right from their own points of view.34 Such justifications are
almost tautologically true. But it does not follow that there is nothing more
to be said and that there is no objective point of view from where we can
judge what is the right thing to do. We cannot do this, if we can do it at all,
just procedurally or formally-we can have no procedural or
methodological fix here-but it can sometimes at least be imperfectly
ascertained that acting in accordance with one point of view rather than
another will lead to the most suffering, the most injustice, the most
extensive denial of rights, and the most humiliation and degradation of
people. The alternative, even with its grave consequences, should be
rejected and the other, as the lesser evil, should be the alternative to be
accepted.35 We cannot always make this distinction, but sometimes we can
and it is part of the vocation of the moralist to try to increase the range of
"sometimes."
V.

CONCLUSION
In summary, I have tried to do two things. First, I have tried to
Do not forget here Rudolf Carnap's point that "certain knowledge" is not
pleonastic, see

Rudolph Carnap, "Truth and Confirmation" in Herbert Feigi & Wilfrid Sellars, eds., Readings in
Philosophical Analysis (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949) at 119-227. However, our
knowledge here, if it is to be something we are justified in acting on, must be very strong indeed.
Though, of course, neither side will publicly call it that.
351 am neither a historian nor an expert on Israeli-Palestinian relations. Surely the account I give
of them here is oversimplified and I may be mistaken in some of the details. But, I think I have got the
essentials right and that I have not told what anthropologists call a just so story. As noted above, see

supra note 19, my account depends, to a considerable extent, upon the work of Edward Said.
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reveal something that is normally hidden from view in popular discussions
of terrorism, namely that there is such a thing as state terrorism and that it
is pervasive and the most pernicious form of terrorism that confronts us.
Second, I have sought to show that it can be the case that in certain
circumstances certain types of terrorism, utilized for certain purposes, can
plausibly be claimed to be both morally and tactically justified.

